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Editor's note: The necessary and frequent use of hazardous sub-
stances by the high technology industry today poses a substantial
threat of liability for environmental harm. Increasing attention paid
by government and individuals to hazardous waste clean up and pre-
vention makes it imperative that the industry be aware of recurring
issues in environmental litigation. The following two articles by Mr.
O'Hara and by Mr. Mays present an overview of several important









Companies operating in the high technology market must be
constantly vigilant against exposure to environmental liabilities.
While each segment of American industry has an area of legal lia-
bility with which it is principally concerned, environmental liability
has increasingly become the bane of the high technology market-
place. The increasing concern with environmental liability can be
attributed to the fact that high technology companies frequently use
chemicals and hazardous substances in their processes and because
environmental liabilities, once established, are extremely costly.
The most alarming characteristic of environmental liability is
that it can reach far beyond the protection of the corporate shell
and reach parent corporations and individual officers, directors and
shareholders. Certain cases have established extremely liberal rules
for imposing successor liability for environmental harm on corpora-
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tions which acquire the assets of a predecessor corporation, even if
the successor did not participate in the operations of the predeces-
sor corporation.I Because environmental liabilities can be so expan-
sive and extensive, it is imperative that every high technology
company remain constantly vigilant against transgressions within
its organization, and implement prophylactic measures to avoid
succeeding to the environmental liabilities of another corporation it
subsequently acquires.
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS,
SHAREHOLDERS, AND PARENT CORPORATIONS
Historically, a shareholder was liable for the obligations of the
corporation only to the extent of the shareholder's investment.2
Thus, the "corporate veil" protected the shareholder individually
against the obligations of the corporation. The parent corporation,
being a shareholder of the subsidiary, was likewise protected against
the obligations of the subsidiary by virtue of the corporate veil.
At common law, there developed the doctrine of "piercing the
corporate veil" in certain limited circumstances, thereby exposing
the shareholder to individual liability. A federal common law rule
evolved for piercing the corporate veil when a federal statute is in-
volved. The federal common law rule for piercing the corporate
veil is far more liberal than that of the general common law.3
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA)4 has brought about a dramatic
change in the common law rule of limited shareholder liability. In
recent cases, personal liability has been imposed directly on officers,
employees and shareholders, including parent corporations, without
piercing the corporate veil. The Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has also taken a very aggressive stand with regard to the
personal liability of officers and active shareholders. The EPA has
announced that it will seek to impose liability on individual officers
and shareholders in the following order of preference:
(1) Direct personal liability under CERCLA;
(2) Indirect personal liability using the liberal federal rule for
piercing the corporate veil;
(3) Indirect personal liability using the traditional common
1. See infra pp. 18-19.
2. 15 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, § 7122
(rev. perm. ed. 1983).
3. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
4. CERCLA §§ 101-157, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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law test for piercing the corporate veil.5
A. The Traditional Common Law Doctrine for Piercing the
Corporate Veil
The traditional common law doctrine for piercing the corpo-
rate veil generally requires a finding of two elements:
(1) the corporation and the shareholder share such a unity of
interest and ownership between them that the two no longer exist as
separate entities; and
(2) inequity would result by the court's failure to disregard
the corporate form.6
The first element of the traditional test is established by a
showing of excessive control or domination such that the corpora-
tion has no separate mind, will or existence of its own.7 In deter-
mining whether the first element has been established, courts will
look to a variety of factors. Specific factors considered relevant by
the courts have included:
(1) A failure to maintain adequate corporate and financial
records;
(2) Commingling of corporate funds with personal funds;
(3) Transacting business in the individual's name rather than
the corporate name; and
(4) Use of corporate assets for personal benefit.8
The second element necessary to pierce the corporate veil
under the traditional doctrine is an inequitable result would obtain
by the court's failure to disregard the corporate form. It is estab-
lished by a showing that a failure to pierce the veil would result in
fraud or injustice to the plaintiff, as where the corporation is not
adequately capitalized or the corporate form has been used to de-
fraud the plaintiff.9
State courts, and federal courts in diversity actions, have tradi-
tionally been reluctant to pierce the corporate veil. Instead, they
5. Price, Liability of Corporate Shareholders and Successor Corporations for Aban-
doned Sites Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, U.S.E.P.A. MEMORANDUM (June 13, 1984).
6. See, eg., Automotriz Del Golfo De California S.A. De C.V. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d
792, 796, 306 P.2d 1, 3 (1957); United States v. Standard Beauty Supply Stores, 561 F.2d 774,
777 (9th Cir. 1977).
7. See Berger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 453 F.2d 991 (5th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972).
8. See, eg., Labadie Coal Co. v. Black, 672 F.2d 92, 97-98 (D.C. Cir. 1982). See also
Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979 (5th Cir. 1974).
9. See Anderson v. Abbot, 381 U.S. 349 (1988); FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632
F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1980); Price, supra note 5.
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have preferred to maintain the protection of shareholders and the
fundamental policy of limited liability.1"
B. The Federal Common Law Doctrine for Piercing the
Corporate Veil
Federal courts have fashioned a more liberal test for piercing
the corporate veil when a federal statute is involved. Simply stated,
the federal common law rule for piercing the corporate veil is "a
corporate entity may be disregarded in the interest of public con-
venience, fairness and equity."11 The federal rule for piercing the
corporate veil is "an inquiry that usually gives less respect to the
corporate form than does the strict common law alter ego doctrine
.. "12 The federal rule avoids the necessity of specific findings that
the corporation and the shareholder share a unity of interest and
that a failure to disregard the corporate form would result in fraud
or injustice to the plaintiff. In fact, a sympathetic federal court need
not go far to make a general finding of "public convenience, fairness
and equity."
The federal common law rule does not entirely abandon the
traditional common law rule, but it relaxes the burden of proof.
Particularly noteworthy about the federal rule are the absence of
specific elements required to pierce the corporate veil, and the broad
discretion vested in the court.
The federal rule for piercing the corporate veil has evolved
from the general policy of giving deference to the intent of Congress
and effect to federal statutes. Generally, the court will look closely
at the statutory purpose and scheme in order to determine whether
the particular statute weighs in favor of protecting the corporate
form. 3 Thus, in environmental litigation involving any one of a
number of federal statutes,14 the court will look to the language and
purpose of the statute in determining whether Congressional intent
10. See generally I W. FLETCHER, supra note 2, §§ 38-41 (discussing the general corpo-
rate entity or personality); Berger Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 453 F.2d 991.
11. Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 221 (1st Cir. 1981) (quoting Capital
Telephone Co. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 734, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
12. Id.
13. See id.; see generally United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.
Ohio 1983) (legislation's sponsors are accorded substantial weight in the interpretation of
statutes).
14. See, eg., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
§§ 101-157, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 101-
403, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(FWPCA)) §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (also known as Clean
Air Act (CAA)); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) §§ 2-31, 7
U.S.C. §§ 136-136(y) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) as amended
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favors protection of the corporate form, and on that basis decide
whether to pierce the corporate veil.
C. Direct Liability Under CERCLA
Armed with the plain language of CERCLA and the strong
federal interest in abatement of toxic waste sites, the courts have
repeatedly imposed liability directly on officers, employees and
shareholders without piercing the corporate veil. While an individ-
ual may claim that he should not be held personally liable for com-
mitting authorized acts within the course and scope of his
employment, the courts have consistently held that an individual is
not protected from liability merely because he acted on behalf of the
corporation if he participates in or sanctions the wrongful act."5
The courts rely on the unambiguous language of CERCLA to
define who shall be liable under that act. CERCLA provides that
any person who is within one of four classes of potentially responsi-
ble parties shall be liable for all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred in abatement of the hazardous waste site. The four classes
of persons who are potentially responsible are:
(1) The current owner and operator of the hazardous waste
facility;' 6
(2) Any person who at the time of disposal of hazardous sub-
stances owned or operated the facility;' 7
(3) Any person who arranged for disposal or treatment, or
arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment,
of hazardous substances; 8 and
(4) Any person who accepts hazardous substances for trans-
port to a disposal or treatment facility. 9 The four classes of per-
sons potentially liable under CERCLA are generally referred to as
owners, operators, generators and transporters.
The critical language in section 107 of CERCLAz° is the term
"any person." The term includes an individual, firm, corporation,
joint venture and governmental entities.2 ' The significance of the
by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) §§ 1002-9010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-
6991(i) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
15. Eg., United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56, 60 (D.N.H. 1984); United States v.
Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. Northeastern Pharm. &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
16. See CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
17. See id § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2).
18. See id. § I07(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3).
19. See id. § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
20. CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
21. See id. § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
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term is that it reaches beyond the protection of the corporate shell
and attaches liability to any person, whether individual or corpo-
rate, that fits within the class made potentially liable.
Courts have never waivered in their construction of CERCLA
as imposing liability on individual officers and employees of corpo-
rations who fit within one of the four classes of potentially responsi-
ble parties. One of the leading cases in this area is United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Company, Inc.
(NEPACCO).22 In NEPACCO, the United States brought a cost
recovery action against a chemical company, the transporter of the
waste products, and certain employees of the corporate defendants.
Defendant Lee was a major stockholder and vice president of
NEPACCO, supervisor of the subject facility, and was directly re-
sponsible for arranging the disposal of the hazardous wastes. As to
Lee, the court noted that corporate officers are normally not person-
ally liable for acts of the corporate entity and conceded that Lee was
not the legal owner of the hazardous waste.23 The court nonethe-
less imposed personal liability on Lee, ruling that Lee need not be
the legal owner of the hazardous waste to be liable as a transporter.
Additionally, the court stated that Lee's unique position as vice
president, supervisor of the facility, and major stockholder was suf-
ficient to classify him as both an owner and operator under CER-
CLA.24 In reaching its decision, the court expressly relied on the
literal language of CERCLA and congressional intent.25
Other cases dealing with the issue of personal liability of corpo-
rate officials, employees, and shareholders, have come to the same
conclusion. In United States v. Carolawn,26 the court imposed per-
sonal liability on corporate officials, noting that "CERCLA contem-
plates personal liability of corporate officials... who are responsible
for the day-to-day operations of a hazardous waste disposal busi-
ness."2 7 The Carolawn court stated that a person who has control
22. 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), modified, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
23. Id. at 847-48.
24. Id. at 848.
25. Id. ("The statute literally reads that a person who owns interest [sic] in a facility
and is actively participating in its management can be held liable for the disposal of hazard-
ous waste. [footnote omitted] Such a construction appears to be supported by the intent of
Congress."). Id. The NEPACCO court also noted that the owner and operator need not be
the same person and if they are distinct entities, both are potentially liable. Id. at 848 n.29.
26. 21 ERC 2124 (D.S.C. 1984).
27. Id. at 2131. Cf United States v. Carolawn Co., 698 F. Supp. 616 (D.S.C. 1987),
aff'd, 847 F.2d 144 (4th Cir. 1988) (In a related case, Carolawn filed a third-party complaint
against South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control alleging that it was
also a responsible party under the Act because of its alleged act of participation in the opera-
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or authority over the activities at a facility or participates in the
management of the facility may be liable.2" The broad statement of
the Carolawn court extends liability beyond the "front line" manag-
ers dealing with day-to-day operations.
In New York v. Shore Realty,29 the court illustrated the con-
trast between finding individual liability through the indirect route
of piercing the corporate veil and direct liability under CERCLA.
In holding that an officer and shareholder were directly and person-
ally liable under CERCLA for the costs of response to environmen-
tal contamination, the court stated that the individual parties would
be liable even though it was "debatable whether a New York court
would hold Leo Grande personally liable by piercing the corporate
veil."30
Parent corporations, being shareholders, are likewise subject to
direct liability under CERCLA. In Idaho vs. Bunker Hill Com-
pany,31 the court held that the evidence presented was sufficient to
hold the parent corporation liable, as an owner or operator under
CERCLA, for its subsidiary's hazardous substance practices and
the clean-up of the subsidiary's facilities. In making its finding, the
court did not rely on the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil.
Instead, the Bunker Hill court adopted the NEPA CCO test in deter-
mining when a corporation is liable as an owner or operator of its
subsidiary's facilities.32 The Bunker Hill court considered the fol-
lowing factors relevant in its determination:
(1) The parent corporation was in a position to be, and was,
intimately familiar with the hazardous waste disposal at the facility;
(2) The parent corporation had the capacity to control haz-
ardous waste disposal;
(3). The parent corporation had the capacity to make decisions
to prevent damage caused by hazardous waste disposal;
(4) The parent corporation had to approve expenditures for
pollution matters exceeding $500;
(5) The parent corporation controlled a majority of the board
of directors of the subsidiary;
(6) The parent corporation received weekly reports on the
subsidiary's operations;
tion of the hazardous waste site. The District Court held that the state agency was not an
"owner or operator" of the hazardous waste site, and thus, was not a responsible party.).
28. Id.
29. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
30. Id. at 1052.
31. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
32. See, eg., id. at 671-72.
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(7) The subsidiary's authorized capital was a "mere" $1,100
while the parent corporation received approximately $27 million in
dividends; and
(8) The parent corporation fully owned the subsidiary.33
Although the several factors relied on by the Bunker Hill court
are also relevant to the test for piercing the corporate veil, the court
relied on those factors in finding that the parent corporation was
directly liable as an owner and operator under CERCLA.34
While the trend has been to impose liability directly on officers
and shareholders, at least one court has ruled that CERCLA does
not impose direct liability on officers of corporations. In Joslyn Cor-
poration v. TL. James & Company, Inc. ,35 the court specifically de-
clined to follow the analysis in several leading cases, including New
York v. Shore Realty,36 United States v. Mottolo,37 and United States
v. Conservation Chemical Company,38 concluding that those courts
had chosen to ignore the corporate form without an express con-
gressional directive.39 However, the Joslyn court also noted that it
would have nonetheless imposed liability in Shore Realty, Mottolo,
and Conservation Chemical under applicable corporate law because
the defendants in those cases had personally participated in the ille-
gal disposal of hazardous waste.' It is unlikely that Joslyn will be
followed by other districts in light of the overwhelming case author-
ity favoring the contrary rule. [Author's Note: On January 29,
1990, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's Ruling in Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. T.L. James and Co.,
Inc., 893 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1990).]
In a recent decision, a district court demonstrated the ease
with which federal courts will impose personal liability directly or
by piercing the corporate veil. In United States v. Nicolet, Inc.,a"
the United States sought to recover response costs incurred by the
EPA in abating the release of asbestos from two waste disposal sites.
33. Id. at 672.
34. Other cases imposing liability on officers, employees, and shareholders include:
United States v. Pollution Abatement Services of Oswego, Inc., 763 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391 (W.D. Mo. 1986); United States
v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884 (E.D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Mottolo, 629 F. Supp. 56
(D.N.H. 1984).
35. 696 F. Supp. 222 (W.D. La. 1988).
36. 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
37. 629 F. Supp. 56.
38. 628 F. Supp. 391.
39. 696 F. Supp. at 224-25.
40. Id. at 232 n.20.
41. 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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Nicolet had purchased the manufacturing facility and waste dispo-
sal sites from Keasbey & Mattison Company in 1962. T&N had
been the sole shareholder of Keasbey & Mattison Company from
1938 until 1967, when Keasbey & Mattison Company was dis-
solved. The United States sought to impose liability on T&N for
the waste disposal practices of its subsidiary, Keasbey & Mattison,
on several theories of "alter ego" liability, and also as the owner/
operator of the hazardous waste site under CERCLA Section
107(a)(2).42
T&N moved to dismiss the United States' claim. The court
denied T&N's motion and, in so doing, enunciated a federal rule of
decision regarding the direct liability of parent corporations and
shareholders who may be liable for response costs. Stating that it is
desirable to have uniform application among the districts of liability
under CERCLA, the court fashioned the following rule concerning
alter ego liability in CERCLA cases:
Where a subsidiary is or was at the relevant time a member of
one of the classes of persons potentially liable under CERCLA;
and the parent had a substantial financial or ownership interest
in the subsidiary; and the parent corporation controls or at the
relevant time controlled the management and operations of the
subsidiary, the parent's separate corporate existence may be
disregarded.43
The court stated that alter ego liability should attach to parent
corporations to prevent fraud, illegality or injustice, or when recog-
nition of the corporate veil would defeat public policy.' 4 However,
the court did not include any such finding as a necessary element
for imposition of parent corporation liability under its federal rule
of decision. The rule enunciated by the district court requires only
that:
(1) The subsidiary be potentially liable under CERCLA;
(2) The parent corporation have a substantial financial or
ownership interest in the subsidiary; and
(3) The parent corporation control the management and op-
erations of the subsidiary at the relevant time.4"
Consistent with the decisions in NEPACCO and its progeny,
the Nicolet court ruled that shareholders and parent corporations
who participate in the management of a facility may be directly lia-
42. § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
43. Nicolet, 712 F. Supp. at 1202.
44. See, eg., id.
45. See, eg., id.
1990]
10 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4W JOURNAL
ble as owners and operators of the facility operated by the subsidi-
ary. Reasoning that there is no basis to distinguish between the
individual stockholder and the corporate stockholder, the Nicolet
court held that a corporate stockholder who actively participates in
the management of the corporation can be held liable for clean-up
costs incurred as a result of the subsidiary's practices.46
More importantly, the Nicolet court adopted the government's
argument that T&N was directly liable as a former owner and oper-
ator of the waste disposal site because T&N was familiar with its
subsidiary's waste disposal practices, had the capacity to control the
disposal practices and abate damage from releases, and benefited
from the subsidiary's waste disposal practices.47 Although not fully
developed by the court, this view appears to require only a showing
that a parent corporation have the capacity to control the disposal
practices of its subsidiary, rather than actual participation in the
management of the subsidiary. If the capacity to control disposal
practices is all that is required, Nicolet establishes an open channel
of liability for every corporate parent which can influence the dispo-
sal practices of its subsidiary.
The Nicolet decision confirms the potential liability of a parent
corporation that has the capacity to control the disposal practices of
the subsidiary. The Nicolet decision also indicates that federal
courts may tend to adopt a liberal uniform federal rule of decision
for imposing alter ego liability in CERCLA cases. A company that
relies on the traditional common law doctrine for piercing the cor-
porate veil may expose itself to liability for response costs incurred
as a result of activities by its subsidiary.
In addition to civil liability, officers, directors, and employees
who have the authority to regulate the use, storage, and disposal of
hazardous substances may also be subject to direct criminal liabil-
ity.48 In United States v. Dee,4 9 three managers of the chemical re-
search and development engineering center at the United States
Army Aberdeen Proving Ground were convicted of criminal viola-
tions of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")5 0
46. Id. at 1203.
47. Id. at 1203-04.
48. Criminal liability for environmental violations is mentioned briefly to provide a
complete overview of potential exposure to individuals. An in-depth discussion of criminal
liability is beyond the scope of this article. For further discussion, see Seymour, Civil and
Criminal Liability of Corporate Officers Under Federal Environmental Laws, 20 ENvTL. RE-
PORTER (BNA) No. 6, at 337-48 (June 9, 1989).
49. (D.C. Md. CR 88-0211, 2-23-1989).
50. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) as amendment to the Solid
Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) §§ 3001-3013, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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Similarly, in United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc.," individual
corporate officials were also convicted of criminal violations of
RCRA.
In light of the present legal environment and ever increasing
judicial willingness to impose individual liability, companies using
hazardous substances in their processes, or those having subsidiar-
ies using hazardous substances in their processes, must be aware of
the potential liability to individuals and parent corporations. The
EPA has issued a memorandum stating the position that it will seek
to impose liability on individuals and parent corporations in the fol-
lowing order of preference:
(1) Direct liability under CERCLA;
(2) Indirect liability by piercing the corporate veil using the
liberal federal rule; and
(3) Indirect liability by piercing the corporate veil under the
traditional common law theory.12 The EPA will undoubtedly latch
onto the Nicolet decision and advocate the adoption of a uniform
federal rule for imposing liability on individuals and parent corpo-
rations in CERCLA cases.
D. Minimizing the Risk of Exposure for Parent Corporations
Under either the theory of piercing the corporate veil or the
theory of direct liability under CERCLA, a court will look to cer-
tain similar factors to determine whether the parent corporation is
involved in the management and control of the subsidiary. Under
the traditional common law rule for piercing the corporate veil, the
control and management of day-to-day operations is relevant to a
determination that the corporation and the shareholder share such
a unity of interest and ownership between them that the two no
longer exist as separate entities. These same factors are relevant in
determining whether the interests of public convenience, fairness
and equity warrant the piercing of the corporate veil under the fed-
eral rule. The degree of control and management by the parent cor-
poration is also relevant in determining whether the parent
corporation is the owner or operator of the hazardous waste facility
for a finding of direct liability under CERCLA.
A corporation can implement measures to minimize the risk of
exposure for the waste disposal activities of its subsidiary. The
opinions in NEPACCO,53 Bunker Hill54 and their progeny are in-
51. 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1208 (1985).
52. See Price, supra note 5.
53. 579 F. Supp 823.
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structive in defining those factors considered relevant by the courts
in imposing liability. At a minimum, the parent corporation
should:
(1) Maintain the separate identities of the parent corporation
and the subsidiary, i.e., maintain separate books and finances, and
avoid common directors, officers and employees;
(2) Provide for adequate capitalization and insurance of the
subsidiary;
(3) Avoid control over the decision-making process regarding
day-to-day operations of the subsidiary, particularly with regard to
the use, storage and disposal of hazardous substances; and
(4) Allow the subsidiary to dictate its own policies and proce-
dures regarding operations and avoid any sort of veto power over
the decision-making process of the subsidiary. While such meas-
ures will naturally wrest control from the hands of the parent cor-
poration, this lack of control is precisely what courts will consider
relevant.
Of course, this is not an exhaustive list of measures to mini-
mize the risk of exposure. Naturally, the steps necessary to obtain
optimum protection depends critically on the facts of each case.
Any parent corporation whose subsidiary uses hazardous sub-
stances in its processes must determine how the parent corporation
can best be sheltered from potential CERCLA liability.
E. Minimizing the Risk of Liability for Individuals
In light of such cases as NEPACCO5 and Carolawn,56 corpo-
rate employees and officials must remain extremely vigilant over the
practices of their employer with regard to the use, storage and dis-
posal of hazardous substances. As a practical matter, the first step
in minimizing the risk of exposure is to ensure compliance with all
environmental laws and regulations. Aside from ensuring compli-
ance, there is little that an individual employee can do to minimize
his personal exposure if he is in a position to control the use, storage
or disposal of hazardous substances.57 The corporate official or em-
ployee cannot rid himself of potential liability by delegating to an-
other employee specific tasks regarding hazardous substance
control. He will remain personally liable to the extent that he has
54. 635 F. Supp. 665 (D. Idaho 1986).
55. 579 F. Supp. 823.
56. 21 ERC 2124, 14 Envt'l L. Rep. 20,696 (D.S.C. 1984).
57. See United States v. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823; United States v. Carolawn, 21
ERC 2124.
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the capacity to control the hazardous substance activities at the
facility. 58
Beyond taking affirmative steps to minimize exposure to legal
liability, insurance, if available, is one way to obtain a measure of
security. While insurance does not affect the legal liability of the
individual, it does provide some security against the financial risks
to which the individual may be exposed. However, if the personal
liability exceeds the limits of the insurance coverage, the individual
will be responsible for the remainder. Although this may appear to
be a sound alternative, in practicality insurance coverage for envi-
ronmental liabilities is rare and, when available, very expensive.
Aside from insurance, a second alternative is to obtain an in-
demnity agreement from the employer. Assuming the individual
can obtain an indemnity agreement, it is likely to be enforceable
only for negligent acts of the employee and not intentional or crimi-
nal acts. Like an insurance policy, an indemriity agreement does
not affect the legal liability of the individual, but provides a measure
of financial security against such liability. Furthermore, an indem-
nity agreement will only provide financial security to the extent of
the indemnitor's solvency.
As a general rule, the EPA will pursue the company first and
will seek response costs from individual corporate officials and em-
ployees if the corporate entity itself is insolvent and not in a position
to satisfy a judgment. In effect, this means that if the company is
solvent, the EPA is not likely to bring an action against the individ-
ual; and if the company is insolvent, the indemnity which the indi-
vidual has obtained provides little or no financial security.
Therefore, indemnity agreements are likely to be of little practical
value.
In order to avoid this paradox, the individual may demand an
indemnity agreement from a parent corporation. But if the parent
corporation grants indemnity to the individual corporate official of
its subsidiary, it has, in effect, opened a direct channel of liability
from the subsidiary to the parent corporation. The parent corpora-
tion would thereby frustrate all of its attempts to minimize the risk
of assuming the environmental liabilities of its subsidiaries.
III. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY UNDER CERCLA
In the previous section of this article, the four classes of per-
sons potentially responsible for response costs under the express
58. NEPACCO, 579 F. Supp. 823; United States v. Carolawn, 21 ERC 2124; United
States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
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language of CERCLA were identified. There is one more class of
persons potentially responsible under CERCLA which is not de-
fined or even mentioned in the act. That class of persons is succes-
sor corporations who are deemed to assume the environmental
liabilities of their predecessor corporations. Successors are here
considered an independent class of potentially responsible parties
because they can be strictly liable under CERCLA for response
costs without being 6n owner, operator, generator or transporter as
defined in CERCLA.
Historically, the doctrine of successor liability allowed a court
to impose on a successor corporation the liability of its predecessor
corporation. The doctrine of successor liability developed most
prominently in the products liability area. 9 Recently, both federal
and state courts have expanded the application of the doctrine of
successor liability to other areas of law and have relaxed the find-
ings required to impose successor liability. Following this trend,
several federal courts have recently applied the doctrine of succes-
sor liability in the environmental context.' The key area of inquiry
in deciding whether to impose successor liability, and therefore the
key area of inquiry in avoiding the imposition of strict liability, lies
in the structure of the transaction by which the successor corpora-
tion acquired the assets of the predecessor corporation.
This section will discuss the historical and current develop-
ments of the doctrine of successor liability and, particularly, the de-
velopment of the doctrine of successor liability in the environmental
context. This section will conclude with recommendations for min-
imizing the risk of successor liability in corporate transactions.
A. Strict Liability Under CERCLA
The primary motivating factor for avoiding successor liability
in a CERCLA action is that CERCLA imposes strict liability on
each potentially responsible party. While CERCLA does not ex-
pressly provide for strict liability, the legislative history of CER-
CLA supports the imposition of strict liability6' and, more
importantly, courts have repeatedly held that liability under CER-
CLA is strict.62
59. See Ray v. Alad Corp,, 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
60. See, eg., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985).
61. See 126 CONG. REc. Hi 1773-803 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (Statement by Represen-
tative Florio that while CERCLA does not refer specifically to strict liability, that standard of
liability is preserved in the Act.).
62. See, eg., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805, (S.D. Ohio
1983); United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
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Strict liability is liability without fault and attaches as a result
of status or relationship without regard to culpable conduct. Where
the contamination caused by two or more people is indivisible, the
liability may be joint and several.63
B. The Development of the Successor Liability Doctrine
Under traditional common law principles, a merger results in
the successor corporation assuming all liabilities of the predecessor
corporation." However, under these same principles, the purchase
of assets alone does not subject the purchaser to the liabilities of the
seller.65
Contrary to the general rule that an asset acquisition alone
does not subject the purchaser to the liabilities of the seller, there
developed at common law four well-established exceptions. Liabil-
ity may be imposed on the purchaser where:
(1) There is an implied or express assumption of liabilities by
the purchaser;
(2) The transaction amounts to a de facto merger or
consolidation;
(3) The successor corporation is deemed to be a "mere con-
tinuation" of the predecessor corporation; or
(4) The transaction was entered into for fraudulent
purposes.66
The exception for implied or express assumption of liabilities
and the exception for fraudulent transactions warrant little or no
discussion here. For purposes of this article, only the exceptions for
de facto merger and mere continuation will be discussed because
they contain the most troublesome pitfalls for corporations and be-
cause they provide the foundation from which has evolved more
liberal theories in recent years.
C. De Facto Merger
A de facto merger occurs where:
(1) There is a continuation of the enterprise of the predeces-
63. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. at 808.
64. 15 W. FLETCHER, supra note 5, § 7121, at 185.
65. Id. at 188.
66. See, e-g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 19 Cal. 3d 22, 28, 560 P.2d 3, 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574,
578 (1977); Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor: Proceeding Re Alleged PCB Pollution,
712 F. Supp. 1010, 1014 (D. Mass. 1989) [hereinafter Acushnet River]; 15 W. FLETCHER,
supra note 5, § 7122, at 189.
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sor in the successor so that there is continuity of management, per-
sonnel, physical location, assets, and general business operations;
(2) There is continuity of shareholders which results from the
purchasing corporation paying for the acquired assets with shares of
its stock;
(3) The seller ceases its ordinary business operations, liqui-
dates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practically possible; and
(4) The purchasing corporation assumed those liabilities and
obligations of the selling corporation ordinarily necessary for the
uninterrupted continuation of normal business operations. 67
The courts utilize these factors to determine whether there has
been a de facto merger by looking at the substance of the transac-
tion rather than its form. 68 From a review of the case law, it is not
clear whether all courts will require a positive finding to each of the
four inquiries. However, the element of continuity of shareholders
is so critical that without a stock transfer there can be no finding of
a de facto merger.69
D. The Mere Continuation Exception
In order to determine whether the purchasing corporation is
the mere continuation of the selling corporation, the court must first
find that:
(1) There is a common identity of stock, stockholders, and
directors between the two corporations; and
(2) Only one corporation remains. 70
Furthermore, one leading case on successor liability, Ray v.
Alad, stated, at a minimum, there must be a showing that:
(1) There was no adequate consideration given for the pre-
decessor's assets and made available for creditors of the
predecessor;
(2) There is one or more common officer, director, or
shareholder.71
67. See, eg., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich.
1974); Philadelphia Elect. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 310 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 980 (1985).
68. See Philadelphia Elect. eo. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303; Acushnet River, 712 F.
Supp. 1010.
69. See, eg., Keller v. Clark Equipment Co., 715 F.2d 1280, 1291 (8th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 1044 (1984). But see Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 397 Mich. 406,
244 N.W.2d 873 (1976) (cash transfer rather than a stock transfer held sufficient to constitute
de facto merger).
70. Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174-75 (5th Cir. 1985).
71. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 29, 560 P.2d 3, 7, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574, 578 (1977).
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Other courts have expanded the mere continuation exception
and will consider other factors in determining whether the purchas-
ing corporation is the mere continuation of the selling corporation.
Other factors considered by the courts include:
(1) Use by the purchaser of the same physical location of the
seller;
(2) Use by the purchaser of the same employees of the seller;
(3) Continuity of product manufactured by the seller;
(4) Use by the purchaser of the same assets, i.e., machinery
and equipment, of the seller;
(5) Continuity of general business operations between the
seller and the purchaser;
(6) Whether the purchaser holds itself out to the public as a
continuation of the seller's enterprise; and
(7) Continuity of name between the seller and purchaser.72
In a recent case, a federal district court held that neither insub-
stantial changes in the type of product being manufactured, nor the
deletion of some product lines and addition of other product lines,
will preclude a finding of mere continuation where the "primary
business" of the predecessor corporation continues in the successor
corporation.73
E. Continuity of Enterprise Exception
A recent development in the doctrine of successor liability is
the emergence of the "continuity of enterprise" theory. The con-
tinuity of enterprise exception to non-liability evolved from the
mere continuation theory. While the tests for the continuity of en-
terprise exception have not been clearly developed or delineated in
case law, it is clear that this theory requires a lesser showing than
the mere continuation exception. The most significant aspect of the
continuity of enterprise exception is that a showing of continuity of
shareholders, officers or directors is not required to trigger the ex-
ception. So long as the party can show a continuity of physical
plant, employees, supervisors, and product, he can establish the
continuity of enterprise exception.74
72. See, eg., Cyr v. G. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (1st Cir. 1974); Mozingo,
752 F.2d at 175.
73. Acushnet River, supra note 66, at 1015-16.
74. See Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1145; Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 168; Ramirez v. Amsted Indus.,
Inc., 86 N.J. 332, 431 A.2d 811 (1981).
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F. The Product Line Exception
The most liberal exception to non-liability for an asset acquisi-
tion is the "product line" exception. The product line exception
was developed in Ray v. Alad,75 and requires an even lesser showing
than that required by the continuity of enterprise exception. The
product line exception provides that if a purchaser of assets contin-
ues the product line of the seller, it may be liable to a plaintiff in-
jured by the seller's product. The product line theory is based on
the public policy of protecting injured plaintiffs whose remedies
against the predecessor corporation have been destroyed by virtue
of the purchaser's acquisition of the business.76 The product line
exception has been adopted in California and New Jersey in prod-
ucts liability cases.7 7
Each of the exceptions discussed above was developed primar-
ily in strict products liability cases. Because CERCLA also imposes
strict liability,78 the above exceptions to non-liability for the acquisi-
tion of assets are employed in environmental litigation with increas-
ing frequency.
G. Successor Liability in Environmental Cases
It is well-established that the doctrine of successor liability will
be applied in environmental cases. 79 The first inquiry in any given
case is to determine which exceptions to the general rule of non-
liability will apply. Each state has its own established common law
with regard to successor liability. While most states recognize the
four traditional exceptions to non-liability, only certain states have
adopted the continuity of enterprise theory and the product line
theory. Furthermore, federal courts are not bound by state law
with regard to successor liability and are at liberty to develop fed-
eral common law with regard to successor liability in cases that
pose federal questions.
The question of which law, state or federal, applies in deter-
mining successor liability was raised in United States v. Bliss.80 In
determining the applicable rules for successor liability, the Bliss
75. 19 Cal. 3d 22, 560 P.2d 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. 574 (1977).
76. Id. at 30-31, 560 P.2d at 8-9, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 579-80.
77. See Ray, 19 Cal. 3d at 22, 560 P.2d at 3, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 574; Ramirez, 86 N.J. at
332, 431 A.2d at 811.
78. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
79. See Smith Land and Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 837 (1989).
80. Although not officially reported, this opinion may be found at U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10683 (E.D. Mo. 1988).
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court stated, "the courts have concluded that Congress intended the
courts to apply federal common law principles to fill in the gaps in
CERCLA's statutory scheme."81 As a concession to state law, the
court stated that it would look to state common law for guidance in
fashioning federal law as long as it was compatible with the pur-
poses of CERCLA. 2
The federal courts are still developing a federal rule for succes-
sor liability and no uniform common law rule has yet evolved.
However, one federal court has stated a federal rule of successor
liability based on business continuity. 3 Although Oner 11 was de-
cided under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act,8" it is highly likely that its ruling will be applied in CERCLA
actions. The rule developed by Oner I1 is akin to the mere continu-
ation and continuity of enterprise exceptions. The Oner 11 rule
makes it possible for a finding of successor liability based on a con-
tinuity of "business."85
At least one state court has applied the product line exception
and found successor liability in the environmental context.8 6 That
court imposed liability on the successor corporation under a New
Jersey state statute similar to CERCLA. Borrowing the product
line exception from the products liability area, the court applied the
liberal test and found that the successor corporation was liable for
the obligations of its predecessor.8 7
Not surprisingly, the EPA favors the liberal approach of the
continuity of enterprise theory. The EPA has indicated that it in-
tends to pursue the application of the "continuity of business opera-
tion" approach adopted in Oner 11."8
In light of the clear congressional intent to abate hazardous
waste facilities, the EPA's aggressive advocacy of the "continuity of
business operation" approach, and the federal courts' liberal discre-
tion to develop federal common law, it is likely that the federal rule
for successor liability, when completely evolved, will be quite simi-
lar to the mere continuation exception or continuity of enterprise
81. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Bliss Court Relied on Smith Land and Im-
provement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86 and United States v. Chem-Dyne, 572 F.
Supp. 802.
82. Bliss, supra note 80. See also Acushnet River, supra note 66.
83. See Oner II, Inc. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 184 (9th Cir. 1979).
84. FIFRA §§ 2-31, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136(6) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
85. See Oner I, Inc, 597 F.2d at 186-87.
86. See Department of Transp. of N.J. v. PSC Resources, Inc., 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419
A.2d 1151 (1980).
87. 419 A.2d at 1163-64.
88. See Price, supra note 5.
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exception developed by some states. In light of this trend in both
the state and federal courts, it has become imperative for a company
to examine closely each corporate transaction it enters in order to
minimize its exposure to the environmental liabilities of the selling
corporation.
H. Minimizing Environmental Liabilities in Corporate
Transactions
1. Due Diligence
Because the courts will look to the substance of a transaction
rather than its form, there is no simple solution to avoiding the en-
vironmental liabilities of another corporation. However, every
company can undertake certain measures in order to minimize the
risk of a subsequent finding of successor liability. The first step in
any transaction is to conduct due diligence even if no acquisition of
real property is planned.9 If potential environmental liabilities are
discovered during due diligence, the company must then perform a
risk analysis to determine whether it is willing to accept the poten-
tial risk. The identification of potential environmental liabilities
may also be used to negotiate with the selling corporation in order
to shift those liabilities to a willing party or provide an escrow fund
to answer for future environmental liabilities. At a minimum, due
diligence will make the purchasing decision an informed one and, if
no potential environmental liabilities are identified, due diligence
may be cited as an equitable factor to a court when it is time for the
court to allocate response costs among various parties.
2. Structuring the Transaction
In structuring the transaction, it is imperative to avoid a stock
for assets transaction because the transfer of stock (i.e., commonal-
ity of shareholders) is a key element in triggering the de facto
merger and mere continuation exceptions.90 While this prevent-
ative measure inherently changes the fundamental structure of the
particular transaction, it is a required measure to avoid a finding of
defacto merger or mere continuation. It is prudent to keep in mind
that the courts are concerned with the substance of a transaction
rather than its form. Superficial or inconsequential modifications to
89. For a discussion of environmental due diligence in real estate transactions, see
Mays, A Practical Guide to Due Diligence in Real Estate Transactions, 10 HAZARDOUS
WASTE REPORT, No. 14, at 11 (March 13, 1989).
90. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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change the appearance of a transaction, without changing the form
of the transaction, will be of no avail.
While using a cash for assets transaction should defeat a claim
of successor liability under the four traditional exceptions, a cash
for assets transaction will not defeat a claim of successor liability if
the federal courts adopt the "continuity of business operation" test
advocated by the EPA. Nonetheless, a cash for assets transaction
will be a relevant factor in making the determination of successor
liability even under the liberal test advocated by the EPA.
In structuring the transaction, the purchaser should strive to
avoid the following factors which are cited by the EPA in its memo-
randum on successor liability:
(1) A substantial continuation of the seller's business opera-
tions by the purchaser;
(2) Retention by the purchaser of the seller's supervisory
personnel;
(3) The inability of the seller to answer for its liabilities (i.e.,
provide an escrow fund to provide for the liabilities of the seller);
(4) The purchaser's continuation of the seller's business at
the same facility;
(5) Use by the purchaser of the same machinery, equipment,
and methods of production as that of the seller; and
(6) The purchaser's production of the same product and/or
product line as the seller.
To the extent possible, the purchaser corporation should also
structure the transaction to avoid the following factors which were
cited by the court in New Jersey Department of Transportation v.
PSC Resources, Inc.91 in finding successor liability under the prod-
uct line exception:
(1) The purchase of all of the seller's assets;
(2) The use of the seller's name;
(3) The use of the same operating personnel and management
as that of the seller;
(4) The use of the same facility as that of the seller; and
(5) The continuation of the same waste disposal practices as
that of the seller.
The purchasing corporation should attempt to incorporate as
many of the following measures as possible into the structure of the
transaction:
(1) Allocate risks in the transaction documents;
91. 175 N.J. Super. 447, 419 A.2d 1151.
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(2) Acquire less than all of the seller's assets;
(3) Install new officers and directors to operate the new
facilities;
(4) Move equipment and machinery to a new location;
(5) Do not require in the transaction documents that the
seller dissolve;
(6) Require the seller to provide an escrow fund to answer for
the claims of third parties; and
(7) Assume no liabilities of the seller.92
As to the last item, the balance sheet liabilities that remain on
the books can be provided for in an escrow fund to be managed by
the seller.
IV. CONCLUSION
The inherent nature of the high technology industry requires
the use of chemicals and hazardous substances in the manufactur-
ing process. As environmental concerns mount and environmental
litigation proliferates, high technology companies will more fre-
quently find themselves defending claims for response costs. Thus,
companies, particularly those in the high technology industry, need
to be aware of the potential liabilities that exist and the transactions
which give rise to them. While many companies and corporate offi-
cials mistakenly believe that only the corporation may be liable, and
then only for its own activities, the federal courts have continually
dispelled that notion.
It has become increasingly well established that corporate of-
ficers, directors and employees can be held personally liable for the
activities of the corporation. Furthermore, through the doctrine of
successor liability, and the liberal trend in the federal courts today,
a corporation may find that it is liable for the activities of another
corporation from whom it has acquired assets. In order to mini-
mize the risks of assuming environmental liabilities, corporations
must remain ever vigilant to ensure compliance with the myriad of
environmental laws on the books today. Furthermore, in structur-
ing its corporate transactions with other corporations, the purchas-
ing corporation must make itself aware of the current status of the
federal rule of successor liability and structure its transactions ac-
cordingly in order to avoid successor liability.
92. See Reed v. Armstrong Cork Co., 577 F. Supp. 246 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Woody v.
Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. Tenn. 1978); Acushnet River, supra note 66;
Korzetz v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Mich. 1979).
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